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ASSET PRICES AND TIME-VARYING  RISK 
ABS  TRACT 
Dbservers  have often characterized  asset markets  as being  subject  to 
periods  of tranquility  and periods of turbulence.  Until  recently, however, 
researchers  were unable  to produce closed-form  asset pricing  formulas in  a 
aodel  environment  of  time-varying  risk.  Some work  by Abel  provided  us with 
the insights  needed  to produce such formulas.  This paper  gives an exposition 
of how to develop  the formulas in an,  environment  where  the formulas may be 
obtained  using a simple  extension  of standard  tools. 
While  the paper  is intended mainly  as an  exposition  of new work,  it 
also contains  a report on  the asset market  effect of fiscal  reform.  IC is 
found that entering  a period  of week  coordination between  government  spending 
end taxing  (tax rate) policy  is good for stock prices. 
Robert  Flood 
Research Department 
International  Monetary  Fund 
Washington,  DC  20431 I.  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an exposition in a familiar 
setting of some new methods in asset  pricing and to indicate some aspects 
of the extension of these  methods to the open economy.  While the paper is 
designed as an exposition of these  new ideas,  the fiscal  policies studied 
in Section  III may be applicable to discussions  of the asset-market 
effects of recent  U.S. fiscal  policy efforts. 
The paper  builds on some work by Andrew  Abel (1986) on obtaining 
closed-form  asset  pricing formulas for a model environment  where agents 
understand  correctly that the nature of risk is time-varying.  j/  In 
particular,  Abel's work was the first that allowed time-varying  dividend 
riak and obtained explicit closed-form  pricing formulas for a representa- 
tive-agent asset-pricing  model where agent preferences  display constant 
relative risk aversion. 
Researchers  have often described  asset  markets as being characterized 
by periods of turbulence  and periods of tranquility.  Before  Abel's work, 
however, we were unable to study explicitly  agents'  reactions to new 
information  about the riskiness  of the asset  pricing environment in a 
framework  of a well-specified time-series  model of tranquility  and tur- 
bulence.  Indeed, typical in asset  pricing work is the examination  of 
agents'  reactions to inconceivable  once-and-for-all  shifts in higher 
moments.  These shifts  are inconceivable  because the models are solved 
/ Others  who have adopted and extended  the Able model include 
Ciovannini (1987) and }Jodrick (1987) both of whom include money in their 
models and can therefore  price assets  in nominal  terms.  In Appendix II, 
some aspects of nominal asset pricing are discussed. -2- 
typically  conditionally on the agents  supposing that relevent  higher 
moments are assuredly  constant through  time.  Researchers  then study the 
effects of risk chsnges by changing  moments (apparently  forever) in a 
pricing formula constructed  under the assumption  that such  moments would 
never change.  The asset market  applicability  of the study  of such miracu- 
lous events is unclear. 
If risk,  in some sense,  changes through time then one way to model 
explicitly intertemporal  variations in the risk environment  is by making 
rik  the outcome of a stochastic  process.  The advantage to adopting an 
explicit stochastic  process for risk is that a stochastic  process is 
useful for separating  shocks  to the risk environment  from predictable 
changes in the risk environment.  Since it is the agents'  reactions to 
their understanding  of the time  variation in risk that provides the link 
between the risk environment  and asset  prices we should  model carefully 
the formation  of agents'  beliefs about the current and future  riskiness of 
their environment. 
Abel studies risk as a time-series  process asauming  representative 
agents  with rational expectations,  constant-relative-risk-aversion  period 
utility functions and assuming a particular  functional  form for 
distribution  functions generating  the underlying  shocks.  This paper will 
study agents'  reactions to shocks in the time-series  process generating 
their stochastic  environment  without assuming a representative  agent and 
without making  particular functional  form distributional  assumptions.  In 
fact,  in this model the stochastic  environment  enters the rational 
expectations  problem in a very familiar  way and obtaining  explicit closed- -3- 
form solutions  requires only a minor extension  of the now well-know method 
of linear  undetetermined  coefficients. 
In order to simplify the analysis some of Able's assumptions  are 
changed.  For clarity,  the simplest assumption  set has been chosen.  In 
making the assumption  substitutions,  however, a possibly important  aspect 
of decision  making may be lost.  In particular,  it is assumed that time- 
separable quadratic  preferences are capable of capturing adequately  the 
consumption-saving  decision facing agents.  Given this approximation it is 
simple to obtain  closed-form  asset pricing functions  for a wide range of 
distribution functions  for the exogenous  variables  without assuming that 
individual  agents  are very similar aside from the functional form of 
preferences.  While the quadratic  preferences  assumption  buys a lot of 
simplicity  it also coats something in  terms  of a possibly important  dimen- 
sion of risk aversion.  With quadratic  period  utility, agents  are risk 
averse  with respect  the risks involving the returns on their asset  holding 
but they are risk neutral with respect to the riskiness of the underlying 
environment.  Quadratic  preferences induce  linearity  in the second moments 
(or variancea) of returns.  This linearity  is the source of much of the 
simplicity  of the present approach. 
The paper is divided into  four additional  sections.  In Section II 
the basic asset pricing  model is developed  for an infinitely  lived 
representative  agent inhabiting  a world with time-varying  risk.  Two 
simple  experi- menta ("warm-upa")  are conducted in this section to 
familiarize  the reader  with the asset-price  solution algorithm.  The warm- 
ups are chosen to illustrate  simply  environments  that might be encountered 
in practice.  In the first example,  dividend  risk moves exogenously  and is -4- 
unconnected to any other aspect  of market fundamentals.  In the second 
example the dividend risk is modelled as a function of past disturbances 
to dividends.  In Section 1111 the model is subjected  to two kinds of 
fiscal  policy experiments.  The first  fiscal experiment  studies how fiscal 
feedback policy (from the level of output)  influences  the  asset  market 
impact  of a  shift in the riskiness  of the environment.  The second  fiscal 
experiment  studies the asset  market effect  of entering  a period of "fiscal 
reform".  Section IV contains some concluding  remarks.  The  text of the 
paper is followed  by three appendices,  the firsc listing some text- 
referenced coefficients,  the second  discussing  some issues concerning 
nominal asset  pricing and the third  explaining  a heterogenous-agent  multi- 
country reinterpretation  of the model. 
II.  A  Real Asset Pricing  Model 
The model to be developed  in this section  is suitable  for pricing 
assets in a hypothetical world that functions  without money.  Initially it 
is assumed that a family  of representative  agents inhabits  a closed 
economy where output is exogenous,  government  is absent.  Preferences  are 
of the representative  agent are represented  by a quadratic  period utility 
function  with lifetime  utility being the discounted  sum of the period 
utilities.  Some of these  assumptions  will be relaxed  later.  The agent's 
problem is: 
1 
maxE  u(cJ$ 
,  O<fl<l 
i—O 
subject to: -5- 
c  .+q  .k  .—o  .k  +d  .k  i—012... 
t+i.  t+i t+i  t+i t+t-l  t+i  t+i-l' 
' 
where 
Et  — the  mathematical expectation  operator conditional  on 
complete time t information, 
u( ) 
—  the period utility  function, 
ct+i  — per  capita consumption  in period  t+i, 
qt+i — price of equity in terms  of consumption  goods  at time t+i, 
kt÷i — number of equity shares  held by the representative  agent at 
time t+i, 
dt÷i — dividend  paid at the beginning  of t+i to the holder  of one 
equity share during t-t-i-l. 
The agents'  first  order condition  for maximizing expected  lifetime 
utility at time t  is: 
(I)  u'(c)q 
— PE(u'(c÷1){q1 
+ 
Define  zt  u'(c)q; at  u'(ct)dt.  Equation (1) now becomes: 
(2)  z 
— flz+1 + Ea1. 
To simplify,  assume that a fixed  capital stock is the only factor  of 
production,  that all output  is paid to equity  holders as dividends  and 
that there  is one equity share  per representative  agent.  Therefore, 
dt — yt,  where y  is per capita  output at time t.  Output depreciates 
fully in one period so that storage is futile.  In equilibrium, therefore, 
ct — yt. 
The solution of (2) is: 
— 
:1Etat+i$i. -6- 
The solution  excludes dynamically-based  inteterminacies  and is the type of 
solution that  will be dealt with throughout  the paper. 
Now, assume  a particular functional  form for period utility: 
(3)  u(c) 
- ac 
-  (l/2)c 
which is quadratic  utility. j/  Since choices  are invariant to linear 
transformations  of the period utility  function,  the constant has been 
suppressed  a constant in (3) which  has been writton to highlight the fact 
that  marginal period  utility for quadratic  preferences  is a one parameter 
family of functions. 
Using (3) and ct — yt — dt,  equation (2) becomes 




which  may also be written as 
j/  Quadratic  utility is objectionable  to some--apparently  on aesthetic 
grounds.  It is sometimes  mentioned that any fixed-psrameter  quadratic 
utility function  will eventually  be "out grown"  by an economy growing 
without bound.  Another way of phrasing this objection is to say that 
attention should  be restricted  to model  environments  where per-capita 
consumption  can grow without bound.  This seems  to me to be a singularly 
unworldly restriction. 
Another line of attack on quadratic  utility  is that other utility 
functions  such as constant relative (or constant sbsolute)  risk aversion 
seem a priori "more  plausible".  Such a point is, of course,  unarguable. 
One can argue, however, that since empirical  work on the stock  market 
(e.g., Flood,  Hodrick, and Kaplan (1987)) rejects many popular period 
utility functions  including constant  relative riak aversion,  constant 
absolute risk  aversion, risk neutrality  and quadratic  utility there is no 
way to choose  among the popular forms on the basis of conformity  with the 
data.  Consequently,  for studies like the current one it seems sensible to 
adopt the utility function  which makes exposition  as transparent  as 
possible-  -quadratic  utility. 
One objection  to quadratic period  utility  which should  not be dis- 
missed is that quadratic  period utility implies risk neutrality  with 
respect to the riskiness  of the environment. As was mentioned in the  text 
this is the technical  source of this paper's  simplicity. -7- 
(3b)  — 
PEtzt+1 
+ ${mEty1-  (Eyt+1)2 
- h] 
where  ht is the conditional  variance of  yt+l' 
2 
h  —E[(y  -Ey  )]. 
t  t  t+l  tt+l 
Like Yt  ht is an exogenous  variable and it will provide most of the 
"action"  presently.  In particular,  the  time series process for ht will be 
the vehicle for modelling tranquil and turbulent  periods.  Notice that the 
t subscript  on ht refers to the period  of the information  set relevant to 
the ht calculstion. 
Before  moving on to the "warm-ups"  notice that equation (3b)  is a 
first-order  linear  stochastic  difference  equation in the variable z  with 
the composite  forcing process given  by the right-hand-most  term in (3a) or 
(3b).  The  experiments  to be performed  here all involve altering the 
composite forcing  term.  If we had simply  adopted a linear  time series 
process for the composite forcing term then  we would solve  (3b) directly 
by the methods of Hansen and Sargent  (1981a,  b).  This would be an 
expedient  method of solving for Zt, but it would not allow  us to study the 
riskiness of the  environment  in isolation  from other aspects of the 
forcing  process. 
Our choice  of period  utility function implies  the moments of y  that 
will appear in the  forcing term in (3b).  With quadratic  utility the  first 
two moments of y  will appear.  If a different  period  utility function  had 
been adopted different  moments would appear in the forcing process. -8- 
The variable zt is the marginal  utility attached  to a unit of the 
equity.  It is equal to period marginal  utility of goods times  the goods 
price of the equity.  It turns  out that it is convenient  to work with z 
rather that qt and so moat of the discussion  centers on Zt.  Usually this 
is a harmless simplification  but not always;  in example 2 in this section 
we study a situation  where the simplification  is not harmless. 
The exposition  begins with some pedantic examples to make clear the 
aspects of the  this type of problem end solution  method that are familiar 
from  previous work and those that are novel to this approach. 
Example 1:  Constant first  moment,  first  order auto-regressive 
conditional  variance 
Assume the following time series processes for y  and  ht: 
(4a)  y+w 
(4b)  -l<$cl, 
where wt is mean zero and serially  uncorrelated.  The stochastic  process 
for yt end ht are assumed to be such  that both are always  positive. 
Further,  a is large enough  compared to any possible  value of y  that 
period marginal utility of consumption  is always  positive,  which requires -9- 
Yt <  a.  Imposing  an upper bound of a on Yt implies boundaries  on ht.  1/ 
Innovations  in ht+l can come from a variety of sources and maybe 
correlated  with innovations  in the y  process or not. iI 
ll  One way to keep variables positive is to introduce  stochastic 
processes of the  form: 
Xc+l  —  X  +  "t+l  Xt  '  Lit+l  0. 
where vt+l is a positive stochastic coefficient  with Etvt÷l  — '.'  and xt 
is any variable in the model.  If written in the standard linear  form,  the 
additive disturbance  becomes proportional  to xt.  It is convenient to 
think about many of the variance and covariance  processes in the paper in 
these  terms.  Further,  when stochastic  processes are assumed for variables 
like y, one can think  of the disturbances  as being generated  as above. 
The requirement  zt > 0 implies that ht is bounded above as well as 
below would be necessary,therefore,  for the variance process, to impose 
conditions such as 0 <  ti < 1 with a moving  upper  bound on t-'c+l  such that 
ht+1 meets the variance upper  bound,  Phillipe  Weil pointed out to me the 
upper  bound implied  by the condition z  >  0. 
In applied work one would work with noncentral  higher moments (here 
the second  moment)  rather than with variances  and covariances  so that 
variance conditions  could  be ignored.  On using this type of model in 
practice see footnote  4. 
21  What is appearing  here is nS  a dynamically-based  indeterminacy 
similar to "bubbles"  or "sunspots."  What is going on is the  required 
modeling (and identification  and estimation  in applied  work) of an 
unfamiliar (possibly  nonlinear)  forcing process.  In fact,  the nonlinear 
rational expectations  model in this paper is even more tightly constrained 
than the typical linear  rational expectations  model in the sense that more 
exogenous  variable equations  need to be estimated  along  with the pricing 
equation than in the  linear  case for fully efficient  estimation. 
The choice  of exogenous  variable processes  used in the examples  was 
guided  by the goal of exposition--not  estimation--and  may not be a good 
approach in applied  work.  For instance, to estimate  parameters in 
example 3 (below  in the text),  I would estimate simultaneously: 
(i) equation (lOa)--the  reduced-form  pricing function; 
iii) equation 
(9a)--the  yt process;  and (lii) a process on y.  The yt process will 
place additional overidentifying  restrittions  on the model (compared  to 
estimating  only the reduced-form  pricing function and a y  process).  From 
discussions  with Robert Hodrick, and Adrian Pagan it seems  to me that it 
might be a good idea in  moat applied work in this  area to keep the 
estimated  model in terms of y  and y  (or their analogs) as in 
equation (3a) rather than invoking the decomposition  allowing the 
transition  to equation (3b).  It would be simple in example 3 to 
reformulate  the pricing function to exclude  ht and put the agents' -  10  - 
An explicit example where  Yt shocks  drive  ht is given later.  For 
now, we need not be concerned  with how conditional  variance shocks  enter 
the model or how they  might be correlated  with shocks to other variables. 
Since Etyt÷l is constant,  recognize  from (3b)  that the only  variable 
entering  the forcing process is ht.  This equation  can be solved using the 
method of linear  undetermined coefficients  by "guessing'  that the  solution 
is linear  in  ht,  substituting  the  trial  solution into the equilibrium 
condition and treating the resulting  equation as an identity.  In 
particular,  consider the trial solution 
(5)  z 
— l0 
+ A1ih. 
The standard  undetermined-coefficients  algorithm reveals  that (5)  is a 
solution only for 
(5a)  A10 
—  { 
-  $h 
},  l-/9 
-/9 
(5b)  A  —, 
11 
1- 
21  (Cont'd  from page 9) forecasting  problem and the reduced-form 
pricing function in terms of a y  forcing  process in addition to the Yt 
forcing process.  The  term  ht was used in the  text for ease of exposition  and could  be reintroduced  for experiments  once one has obtained consistent 
estimates  of the behavioral  parameters. 
In practice,  h  is difficult to model because the researcher  has no 
direct  observations on ht and because constructing  ht requires that the 
researcher  correctly  model the agents'  Etyt+l.  This point was made by 
Pagan (1984)  and is very closely related to Flavin's (1983) critique of 
some of the empirical stock-price  variance bounds literature.  At the time 
of Flavin's paper it was pointed out to me by Richard Porter that the 
variance bounds literature  could  be consistently  recast in terms of first 
and second  moments and that  message seems  to extend here. -  11 
- 
where  S  — (a 
- y)y > 0.  Now divide each side of (5)  by (a 
- yt)  to 
obtain: 
+ 
(6)  —  ___________ 
a  - 
In  this example, two things are responsible  for the  stochastic 
behavior of the price of equity,  q.  First,  real output disturbances  will 
influence  yt and thereby  u' (ye) — u' (ct) 
.  The  influence  of  current  output 
shocks  therefore  shows  up  in  the denominator  of (6) with an increase in y 
(through  an increase in  wt)  increasing  qt  Second,  new information  alter- 
ing agents'  beliefs about the variance of future  real output shocks  shows 
up in h.  Information  that  makes agents  think that future  output  variance 
will be higher, will lower 't at the rate All/u'(ct).  Notice that A11 
deponds on ,  which  is one of the parameters  in the ht time series 
process.  If  is large  then a shock to ht is relatively  persistent  and 
has a large effect  on qt as compared  to a case where  is small and shocks 
to ht are transitory.  Notice  that the framework  can handle  very 
persistent shocks  to ht in that it can handle  any  such that jfl < 1/fl. 
Examole  2:  ARCH 
The methods of Engle  (1982)  and Bollerslev  and Engel (1986) suggest 
an alternative  formulation  of the behavior  of the conditional  variance, 
ht.  Retain equations (3b) and (4a),  the equilibrium  Euler equation and 
the yt process respectively,  but alter  the structure  of the conditional 
variance equation to: 
(7)  h 
— h  +  Lw2. -  12  - 
This  example differs from the previous one in that output  shocks,  wt, 
alter agents'  beliefs about the distribution  of future  output shocks.  If 
an output shock is large  (in absolute  value) the agents  will raise their 
current beliefs about  the variance of future  output  shocks.  Here, make 
use of the fact  ht — Etw+l and  recognize  that (7) is structurally  very 
similar to (4b)  .  Consequently  the trial  solution for zt retains its 
previous functional  form but with Sw  replacing  ht.  In particular: 
2 
(8)  z 
— 
A20 +  A2iw, 
where 
(8a)  A20  A10  (given  in (5a)), 
(8b)  A2 
— 




(8c)  q  — _____________ 
a  -  (y + w) 
In this example,  the effect of a positive output  shock,  Wt,  on equity 
price, qt (compared  to wt — 0)  depends on specific  parameter  magnitudes 
since  positive w  both decreases  current marginal  utility of consumption 
acting  toward increasing  equity price  and increases  agents  perception of 
future  variance acting  toward decreasing  equity  price.  The net result 
will depend  on specific  parameters. -  13  - 
A negative wt,  on the other  hand,  lowers  qt (compared  to wt — 0).  jJ 
This example preaents an interesting  possible asymmetry in the reaction of 
equity  price to positive  versus negative real shocks. 
III.  Government Policy  and Asset Prices 
In this section the model developed above  will be used to study two 
issues.  First,  how does government  expenditure  policy influence  the way 
changes in an the economy's stochastic  environment  impact the asset 
market?  Second,  how does the asset  market react to entering  a period of 
likely  fiscal reform?  The concept of likely  fiscal reform  is, 
characterized  here by an upward shift in the covariance  of innovations  in 
government spending  and innovations  in the income  tax rate.  This 
definition of fiscal  reform  does not take a stand on the direction of 
movement of tax rates  or government expenditure;  it considers only the 
association  between government  spending changes and tax rate changes. 
While the questions  studied in this section  have some independent  interest 
they were chosen to illustrate  some aspects of the model.  The first 
question is chosen to illustrate  the asset  pricing effect  of the 
interaction  of first  moment and variance processes and the second  is 
1/  Examining equation (6),  it is clear  that while the present approach 
is helpful for examining the impact of underlying  risk shifts on asset 
price,  it is no big help in examining the effects of underlying  volatility 
shifts on asset-price  volatility.  The problem is that to convert to asset 
price one must divide  zt by the marginal  utility of consumption. Since 
this marginal utility will in equilibrium  involve  the level  of output,  the 
conversion to asset price from Zt involves  dividing  by a linear  function 
of a stochastic  disturbance. Asset price is therefore,  in this set up,  a 
nonlinear function of the underlying  disturbances.  Studying the 
volatility  of asset  price  usually requires that the expectation  of asset 
price  be calculated.  Such calculations for nonlinear functions  are 
distribution-function  specific and will be avoided  here. -  14  - 
chosen to illustrate  the adaptability  of this  kind of model to studying 
time series  processes involving  the covariance. 
This section  uses the closed-economy  equity-pricing  model introduced 
earlier.  The closed  economy is a useful fiction  here since income  tax 
rates need not be uniform across countries.  Without uniform taxes agents 
need not face the same effective prices,  making  aggregation  much more 
difficult than is the case presently. 
1.  Introducing  the government 
Introducing  the government  requires that the budget constraints  and 
equilibrium  conditions  be modified.  It is assumed that the government 
purchases goods in the goods market,  collects a proportional income  tax 
and collects a lump-sum tax.  The government's  budget constraint  is: 
(9)  — ry 
+ 
where t  is per-capita  government  consumption  rt is the income tax rate 
and e  is  the per-capita lump-sum tax.  The after-income-tax  average 
individual  budget constraint  is now: 
(9a)  c  + qk 
+  —  +  (1 
- r)d)kt1. 
Goods market equilibrium  requires: 
(9b)  c+g—y 
For the issues  studied in this section it is assumed that government 
purchases do not influence the marginal  utility of private consumption. 
The average Euler equation for equities,  written for equilibrium is -  15 
- 
(9c)  2 





where z  is now the product of the market  price of equity and average 
marginal utility of consumption. 
In writing (9c),  equilibrium  average  consumption,  ct — yt 
- g, has 
been used in place of ct and private after-tax  income  becomes the pay-out 
to equity  holders.  Lump-sum taxes  are present only as a government-budget 
balancing item. 
2.  Government  feedback oolicy.  volatility,  and the equity  market 
The question to be investigated here is:  "How  does government expen- 
diture  policy influence the way in which volatility  impacts the equity 
market?"  To investigate  this question  we adopt the following settings. 
(lOa)  — y +  + w  1p11  <  1 
(lOb)  Eh+i 
+ h 
(bc)  — g  +  ÷  + '  ltd < 
l,lp2l 
< 1. 
Further, to focus  on expenditure  policy set rt — 0  all t.  The impor- 
tant difference  between the set up currently  and that  used previously is 
that  now a government  expenditure  policy rule  has been adopted. According 
to this rule,  equation (bc), government  spending is determined  by a 
constant,  past government spending,  the amount of current output  and a 
white noise disturbance,  c. 
The short  cut of examining the influence  of policy on zt rather than 
on q  is adopted.  As before, the transformation  between zt and q  can be 
made by dividing zt by marginal utility.  Keep in mind that by -  16  - 
concentrating  on  we are looking only into the future.  This is 
reflected in equation (9c) by the fact that the entire right-hand-side  of 
the zt equation gives zt as the current  expectation  of future events. 
Following  the methods of the previous section, substitute (lOa), 
(lOb)  and (lOc)  into (9c) with rt+1 — 0 and find that the forcing process 
(for Zt)  is linear in Ft  ht,  gt, and gtyt•  The following  trial 
solution is therefore attempted: 









(l2a)  A42 
— p(l 
-  p)[0A45 
+  -  1] 
(12b)  A43 
- [p(1 
- 




(12d)  A45  p1p2(l 
- 
The  coefficients 
A40 
and  A41  are  reported  in  the appendix. 
The equity-market  impact  of ht is  given  by A43,  which is proportional 
to A42,  the coefficient attached to y.  This occurs  because h  enters the 
problem only through agents' forecasts  of future  squared output. 
Government  expenditure  policy can influence the asset market impact 
of changes in risk.  In particular,  the asset  market impact of risk is 
proportional  to  [vA45 + r 
- fl.  The size and sign of this term depends on -  17 
- 
,,  which  can assume  any value  between -l and 1. j/  When q < 0 government 
spending policy is counter-cyclical  and the spending  feedback exacerbates 
the effect of risk on the market.  When n > 0 government  spending is pro- 
cyclical and dampens  the effect  of risk on the market.  What is going on 
is that counter-cyclical  government  spending  policy,  ,j <  0, induces a 
negative covariance  of t  and y.  A larger  absolute  negative covariance 
(as would be induced  by a positive  ht shock) acts toward  lowering the 
marginal utility of future  dividends.  This acts in conjunction  with the 
standard effect  of ht to give larger  variations in the equity  market as a 
result  of ht disturbances.  On the other  hand,  when q > 0 the above 
covariance  is positive and its effect is to act toward  offsetting  ht's 
standard effect. 
The effect isolated  here is conceptually distinct  from the way the 
equity  market reacts to an output  shock.  In particular,  A43  gives the 
partial derivative  of zt with respect to  ht.  It is therefore  answering a 
question about the equity  market impact  of a risk shock as distinct from 
an output shock. 
3.  Fiscal  reform and the equity  market 
The question to be studied  here is:  "What is the equity  market 
effect  of entering a period  of likely  fiscal reform?"  To confront the 
question  with our tools,  "fiscal  reform" must be a recurring  event with 
agents  understanding the time series  process of fiscal  reforms.  We can 
j/  A  condition that an increase in long-run  output of one unit should 
bring about a less than  unitary increase  in long-run  government  spending, 
-  p1)  C 1, would ensure A43 C 0.  It is not clear,  however, why in 
this  model such  a  condition  should  be imposed since long-run  output is not 
time-varying. -  18  - 
then  come-to-grips  with the narrower  question:  "What  is the equity market 
effect of a disturbance  to the "fiscal  reform" time series process?"  The 
following settings  are adopted: 
(13a)  — y, 
(13b)  — g + 
Vt, 
(13c)  — r + x, 
(13d)  Ex  V  tt÷lt+l  t 
(13e)  ESt1 
+ 6. 
In equation (l3a),  output  has been set at a constant  allowing us to 
concentrate  attention  on fiscal  policy  disturbances.  In (13b)  and (13c) 
government  spending  and the  tax rate respectively  are assumed to follow 
stochaatic  processes  around fixed  means.  The disturbance  terms  in (13b) 
and (13c), Vt and xt,  are white noises.  The conditional  covariance  of Vt 
and xt is given  by 6t-l and the conditional  expectation  of the time-series 
process of this covariance  is given  by equation (13e).  The conditional 
covariance,  6, is playing the same type  of role played  previously  by ht. 
A  period  of "fiscal reform" is defined  presently to be a period  when 
St is high.  For an economy to move into  a surprising  period of fiscal 
reform  is to have the economy receive  a high S.  The  fiscal  reform  model 
used here is cynical in that nothing ever happens to the means of per- 
capita  government  spending  and the income  tax rate.  This is intended only 
as an analytical  convenience  allowing  separation  of the riskiness  of a 
fiscal  reform  period from the type of reform  expected. -  19  - 
Notice that the present idea of fiscal  reform  deals only with the 
coordination  of tax and spending policies.  It is eclectic with respect to 
the direction  of change  of both spending and the tax rate.  A  period of 
fiscal  reform is therefore  a period  when the tax rate and per-capita 
spending are likely to move in the same direction. 
For this issue  we follow  previous practice  by substituting  from 
equations (13s)-(13e)  into equstion (lOc)  and noticing that the forcing 
process (for zt)  is linear in 5.  The  trial  solution  therefore  is: 
(16)  — 
Aso + 
where 
(16a)  A51 
—  8y 
1  - fi 
The  constant  term,  A50  is 
that entering a period of 
close coordination  of tax 
entering a period of weak 
spending increases  zt. 
The intuition  for this result is that (roughly)  things  that are good 
for zt are things  that increase  the expected  future  marginal utility of 
after tax dividends.  The tax rate enters  after tax dividends negatively 
while government  spending  enters  marginal utility  positively.  The covari- 
ance of the tax rate and spending therefore  enters  negatively. 
given in the appendix.  Since A51 < 0, we find 
likely fiscal  reform,  i.e.  ,  entering  a period of 
and spending  policy,  decreases  zt.  Conversely, 
coordination  of tsx rates and per capita -  20  - 
IV.  Concluding  Remarks 
The purpose of this paper was to exposit and apply in a simple  and 
familiar framework  some ideas  developed  recently  by Abel.  This line of 
research  allows  us for the first time  to ask in a consistent  way questions 
concerning  agents'  reactions  to predictable  and unpredictable  alterations 
in the riskiness  of their environment. The framework  seems to have wide 
potential applicability  to problems such as options pricing and optimal 
government  stabilization  policy where the nature of and reactions to time- 
varying risk are at the center of the problem. -  21  -  APPENDIX  I 
Text Coefficients 
This appendix  records several coefficients  mentioned  in the  text. 
(All)  A40 




-  y2+y2] 
+ 
A44g 
+  A45(y2  + yg)} 
(Al.2)  A41 




+  + p1)y 
+ A44p1 + ap1 +  (A55p1 
+ 
p1)g} 
(Al.3) A50 — (1-a)  S + y(a 
-  y+ g)(l 
-  r)] -  22  -  APPENDIX  II 
Some  Aspects  of Nominal  Asset  Pricing 
The model developed  in  the text  was designed  to allow  pricing  of 
assets  in real terms in a hypothetical  world  that functions  without  money. 
One  is interested,  however,  in  nominal  asset pricing  since  nominal  units 
are  the typical units of real-world  asset  pricing.  While  it is outside 
the direct  realm of this paper,  this appendix  gives an example  of asset 
pricing  in a nominal  environment  where risk  may be time-varying. 
Money is introduced  via the simplest  mechanism  available  in the 
.trrent  literature,  strong  cash-in-advance.  In this monetary  introduction 
scheme,  also  known  as a Glower  constraint,  it is assumed  that agents  must 
use money  to buy goods.  It is also assumed  that when the money  is 
acquired  by agents,  the agents  know exactly  the quantity  of goods  that 
they  will purchase  with  the money.  Later  a somewhat looser  version of a 
Glower-constrained  model will  be discussed. 
Accommodating  money  in  our model  requires  that we reset budget con- 
straints.  In  particular,  it is assumed  that all money  enters  (leaves)  the 
model  via lump-sum  transfers  (taxes)  from  (to)  the government.  The 
government,  which  takes no role in this economy other  than  provider  of 
money, has a budget  constraint  given by PG  —  Mt 
- Mj, where t  is the 
money  price  of  goods  and Mt is the per-capita  money  stock. 
The private  individual  now  must obey a pair of  constraints,  the first 
tonstraining  his purchases  of asset  and  the second  constraining  his pur- 
chases  of goods.  This is natural in a cash-in-advance  economy  since  only 
goods  carry  the special condition  that  they  must  be purchased  with money. 
The constraints  are: -  23  -  APPENDIX II 
(A2.l)  Mt+ Pqk 
+  P  (q+d)k1 
+  Bt1+ 
(A2.2)  Mt 
with (A2.l)  and (A2.2)  constraining asset and goods purchases 
respectively.  Previously defined symbols retain their  meaning.  B  is 
per-capita nominal bonds and it is the nominal rate of interest.  The 
Euler equation for bond holding is 
(A2.3)  u'(c)/P  (l  + i)E[u'(c+i)/P+1]. 
Imposing Ct 
—  Yt and Mt  Ptyt and rearranging  obtain 
(A2.4)  (1 + i)1 — 
where gt÷l  and °t+l  Mt/Mt+i.  Rewrite  (A2.4)  as 
(A2.5)  (1 + i)  + 
where  w,,  is the covariance  of t÷l and t+l  conditional  on time t informa- 
tion. 
Leaving aside wt for now,  we see that the moments of t+l will enter 
as directed  by utility function choice.  If quadratic utility is 
chosen,  the  first two moments of the Yt+l distribution will be important 
in determining the nominal interest rate.  For other  utility function 
choices other  moments will enter the pricing function. 
To the extent that  money is exogenous to the private sector  we have 
much less economic guidance when calculating  Etnt+l.  The problem is that 
we have no way of knowing offhand what mathematical function of money is 
being given a distribution function by the policy authorities.  For -  24  -  APPENDIX II 
example,  suppose  policy  authorities  choose  a  rule  like  Mt  — M  + ut where 
ut is white and has some known distribution.  Since agents need to 
calculate Ecnt÷l they must calculate  MtEt(l/Mt÷l) and if a distribution is 
given for ut÷l then aspects of that distribution function must be invoked 
in the calculation and,  in general, the calculation will be a function of 
the entire shape of the distribution function. 
For the above reason  moments of the money supply rule other than 
those typically considered  important for nominal interest rates might 
entet a reduced-form interest rate function,  Df course there  is no good 
reason for the authorities  to adopt a distribution pertaining to the level 
of money.  The monetary authority could  make agents' calculations a lot 
easier if they were to adopt a rule on gt÷l,  e.g.,  gt+l — g + wt+l,  where 
wt÷l is white noise.  For a monetary authority rule on t÷l no moments of 
wt÷l's distribution other than the mean,  zero,  would enter the nominal 
interest rate reduced  form. 
The reader may have noticed that the above methods for introducing 
unusual moments of the monetary disturbance into the interest rate reduced 
form are essentially  unrelated to the asset pricing framework.  These 
moments are being introduced  by the model's requiring agents to form 
expectations of nonlinear functions of the policy  variables.  For the same 
reasons these moments could turn up in standard descriptive macro-models. 
Suppose, for example, that agents are following a log-linear  macro-model. 
The solution of the model (e.g.  ,  for  the  interest rate)  might require the 
model's agents to form expectations of future logs of money.  If the 
policy authority is following  money-supply a rule on the level of money 
with an additive shock then descriptions of the distribution of that shock -25-  &EfENDIXII 
(possibly including  higher moments of the distribution)  will appear in the 
reduced form expressions  for the endogenous  variables. 
A much more interesting  area of study is suggested  by the term ut  in 
(A2.5).  Through this term the covariance of a monetary variable, nt+l, 
and a real variable, gt+l,  can influence the nominal rate of interest. 
Similar covariance terms have been an important topic  in macroeconomics 
since its inception. 
The model used in this appendix was adopted for ease of discussion. 
Essentially the same points apply in the  cash-in-advance  models of the 
type used by Hodrick (1987)  and Giovannini (1987) where money must be 
gathered before the  resolution  of other aspects of the period's 
uncertainty.  This alteration in the timing of the resolution of 
uncertainty simply alters the  timing of variables entering the  interest 
rate reduced form. -  26  -  APPENDIX III 
Heterogenous Agent. Multi-Country Reinterpretation 
The analysis in the text was based on a representative-agent  closed 
economy model to facilitate  comparisons  with other work in that setting. 
The purpose of this appendix is to show that the model  we have used has a 
much broader interpretation  than we have placed on it.  Indeed  we will 
find that once quadratic  period utility has been assumed, aggregation in a 
world of heterogenous agents is straightforward. 
In a world where agents from different countries are  endowed with 
different wealth levels  and have different period utility functions  but 
where each agent  has quadratic period utility, each agent faces  the 
following problem: 
max E  (1 [l/2](c4.)2)$u, 




c1  .  +  q  k1  q  Ac3  .  ÷  d  Ac1  -  ti-i  t+i  t+i-l  t+i t+i-l  ti-i t+i-l 
The symbols in the above  problem retain moat of their  previous meaning, 
but now symbols with a j superscript  apply only to individual  j, where 
j — l,2,3,...J. 
It is not necessary to make any special assumptions  about the country 
of location of the individuals  for asset pricing. ]j  However, certain 
assumptions are required for simple aggregation.  First, all agents use 
the same expectation  operator; information  is therefore  homogenous across 
j/  Of course locating agents by country would be crucial for country- 
bookeeping such as current account, capital accounts, etc. -  27  -  APPENDIX III 
agents.  Second,  the subjective  discount rate,  fi,  is identical  for all 
agents.  Third, all agents face identical  prices for goods  and assets. 
The parameters in the period utility function and individual wealtha 
can differ across individuals. As before,  however, constant terms in the 
period utility functions have been ignored and each individual's period 
utility function  has been normalized  by dividing the function  by 1/2 of 
the parameter attached to (cj)2.  Individual period-utility-function 
differences are therefore contained entirely in the parameters  a). 
Each individual's optimization problem will imply  an Euler equation 





-  c1J/J)(q1 + dt+1). 




If all output is paid out as dividends  we obtain an Euler equation very 
similar to (3a)  in the  text.  The only difference between (A3.l)  and (3a) 
is that in (A3.l),  the Euler equation  parameter derived from the period 
utility functions is the average across  j of the constant terms in 
individual  period marginal utility while m in (3a)  is the representative 
agent's constant term in period marginal utility. 
This implies that the results in the previous section are not very 
sensitive to the closed economy representative agent assumption.  They -  28  -  APPENDIX III 
would,  however,  be  sensitive  to  different  discount  rates  across  agents  or 
agents  facing  different  effective  prices  as  would  happen  in  a  multi- 
country  setting  with  goods  or  asset  market  distortions. -  29  - 
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